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ABSTRACT The ability of the online marketing industry to track and profile users’ Web-browsing activity
is what enables effective, tailored-made advertising services. The intrusiveness of these practices and the
increasing invasiveness of digital advertising, however, have raised serious concerns regarding user privacy.
Although the level of ubiquity of tracking and advertising has been investigated in top-world sites based in
North America and Western Europe, the extent to which those practices are carried out in territories with
less or no legal coverage—in terms of data protection— has not been studied so far. In this work, we present
the first detailed measurement of online tracking and advertising conducted to date in one of those regions,
namely, Ibero-America, by analyzing local websites (e.g., education and government sites). In doing so,
our measurement study aims to find out how user location as well as the type of publisher may impact
on tracking and advertising and thus user privacy. Lastly, our thorough, extensive analysis also explores
whether differences are appreciated between Latin America and the EUwith regard to the third-party tracking
conducted from and towards the corresponding countries.
INDEX TERMS Online tracking, advertising, privacy risks, Ibero-America.
I. INTRODUCTION
Personalized online advertising is responsible for much of
the online tracking performed over users these days. Online
advertising platforms are supported by personalization sys-
tems that tailor ad-content according to the users’ prefer-
ences, learned from data collected through Web tracking.
Evidently, the more information is gathered, the better the
performance of personalization systems, and the higher the
profits of the advertising platforms. Since online advertising
has become a millionaire business [2] that apparently sup-
ports the very existence of the Internet [3], there is a great
motivation from multiple agents to collect more and more
data, which ultimately exacerbates online tracking.
Online tracking refers to the activity of closely following a
user wherever she ‘‘goes’’ while browsing the Web. Tracking
is possible nowadays as we leave innumerable footprints
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Claudio Agostino Ardagna .
online, even without noticing it, when browsing. The IP
address, operating system, browser type, plugins installed,
patches applied, and browsing history are just some examples
of the data leaked in a single HTTP request. When multiple
browsing sessions are compiled and processed over time,
tracking entities can profile and segment users on the basis of,
for example, their location [4], shopping habits, sexual prefer-
ences [5]1 and political leaning [6]. Obviously, the fact that all
such user information may be available to thousands of such
entities raises serious privacy and security concerns [7], [8].
In this scenario of ubiquitous tracking —more typical of
a dystopian society—, the first potential tracker is the web-
site (also known as publisher) the user visits, as we shall
describe later in Section II. Thus, if tracking is carried out
by the publisher, it is called first-party tracking. In general,
the audiences of first parties are pretty segmented, so that
1The cited article explores tracking and privacy risks on pornography
websites. The analysis of over twenty thousands of such websites showed
that 93% leak user data to a third-party.
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the tracking those parties might perform is usually innocu-
ous. Some exceptions are the ecosystems represented by the
Internet giants (e.g., Facebook, Google), which concentrate
services for millions of users within a single corporation.
In addition to first-party tracking, a single user web-request
commonly triggers connections from their browser to several
third parties that receive part of the aforementioned infor-
mation. This information is used by third-parties to support
real-time services such as personalized advertising, media
hosting (by content distribution networks), load balancing
and social networks. Figure 1 illustrates the interactions trig-
gered by a browser request, which enable first and third-party
tracking. Figure 2 shows, on the other hand, the large number
of connections to third parties (information flows) that may
occur when a user visits three websites.
FIGURE 1. A single user’s visit to a website (1) generates a response (2)
that commonly includes redirection commands that spawn further
connections to third parties (3).
Unlike physical user tracking, e.g., in a street, online track-
ing is much less evident for users because it is carried out
on the background of web browsing. Unfortunately, there is
very little evidence available for users to realize the latent
pervasiveness of such practice.
Due to its prevalence on the Web, measuring online track-
ing could be a way to characterize the privacy risks of Internet
users. The severity of those risks may be illustrated through
different indicators such as the level of exposition of user
interactions to third parties, the concentration of user infor-
mation on a few advertising companies, the dynamic behavior
of tracking for websites belonging to certain categories, or the
suspicious requests to third parties triggered when accessing
government web sites [10].
While related work [11] has investigated tracking and
advertising in the most popular sites worldwide,2 our mea-
surement study focuses on the online tracking and adver-
tising triggered by local websites (e.g., education and
2The cited work restricts to top-world sites based in North America and
Western Europe.
FIGURE 2. Illustration of the multiple connections to third parties (more
than 50) generated in the background after visiting only 3 sites. The
points where connections originate represent the websites while the little
triangles represent the third parties contacted. This figure was obtained
through the browser extension Disconnect [9].
government sites), specifically those from Ibero-American3
countries. In doing so, our experimental analysis aims at find-
ing out how user location as well as the type of publisher may
impact on the tracking and advertising interactions and thus
user privacy. Therefore, unlike previous research, our study
aims to investigate a very heterogeneous region like Latin
America (LATAM) and compare the tracking and advertising
practices with those in the European Union (EU), in terms of
the adoption of modern personalization systems —including
behavioral advertising— and the maturity of user perceptions
regarding privacy. In this same regard, our analysis will also
explore whether differences might be appreciated between
LATAM and the EU with regard to the third-party track-
ing conducted from and towards the corresponding coun-
tries. This might be of particular interest since the General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)4 became enforceable in
May 2018 in the EU and the European Economic Area, while
LATAM is considerably less effective in this field—let alone
many of the countries in the latter region lack regulation for
privacy.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section III
describes the methodology followed in this work, includ-
ing data collection, processing, and experiments. Section IV
presents our measurement results regarding online tracking
and advertising in Ibero-America. Finally, conclusions are
drawn in Sec. V.
3Ibero-America is a region in the Americas comprising countries or
territories where Spanish or Portuguese are predominant languages, usually
former territories of Portugal or Spain.
4The GDPR is considered the toughest privacy and security law in the
world.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. ONLINE TRACKING AND ADVERTISING
This section examines the online advertising ecosystem, pro-
viding the reader with the necessary depth to understand the
technical contributions of this work. For a detailed, complete
explanation on the subject, the reader is referred to [12], [13].
B. KEY ACTORS
The online advertising industry is composed by a consider-
able number of entities with very specific and complementary
roles, whose ultimate aim is to display ads on Web sites.
Publishers, advertisers, ad platforms, ad agencies, aggrega-
tors and optimizers are some of the parties involved in the
ad-delivery process [14]. Despite the enormous complexity5
and constant evolution of the advertising ecosystem, the pro-
cess whereby ads are presented on Web sites is usually char-
acterized or modeled in terms of publishers, advertisers and
ad platforms [16]–[22]. Next, we provide a description of
these three key actors:
• A publisher is an entity that owns a Web page (or a Web
site) and that, in exchange of some economic compen-
sation, is willing to place ads of other parties in some
spaces of its page (or site). An example of publisher is
The New York Times’ Web site.
• An advertiser is an entity that wants to display ads on
one of the spaces offered by a publisher, and is disposed
to pay for it. Advertisers typically engage the services
of one or several ad platforms (described below), which
are the ones responsible for displaying their ads on the
publishers’ sites. As we shall explain later in Section III,
there exist two ad-platform models, allowing users to
have two different roles. In the traditional albeit prevail-
ing approach, advertisers indicate the targeting objec-
tive/s most suitable for their campaigns, that is, to which
users they want their ads to be shown. For example,
an advertiser may want the ad platform to serve its ads
to an audience interested in politics or to people living
in France. Advertisers must also specify the amount of
money they are willing to pay each time their ads are
displayed, and each time users click on them.6 On the
contrary, in the recently established model of real-time
bidding (RTB), ad platforms allow advertisers to bid for
each ad-impression at the time the user’s browser loads a
page. This model enables advertisers to make their own
decisions rather than relying on an intermediary to make
decisions for them [13].
• An advertising platform or ad platform is a group of
entities that connects advertisers to publishers, i.e., it
receives ads from advertisers and places them on the
spaces available at publishers. To this end, ad platforms
track and profile users with the aim of targeting ads to
their interests, location and other personal data. As we
5 The intricacy of the advertising ecosystem is often illustrated in confer-
ences and related venues with the diagram available at [15].
6In the terminology of online advertising, these quantities are referred to
as the cost-per-impression (CPI) and the cost-per-click (CPC), respectively.
shall describe in greater detail in the next subsection,
traditional ad platforms carry out this targeting on their
own, in accordance with the campaign requirements
and objectives specified by advertisers. RTB-based ad
platforms, on the other hand, share certain user-tracking
data with advertisers, which then take charge of selecting
who suits them by deciding which user to bid for. Some
examples of ad platforms include DoubleClick, Gemini
and Bing Ads, owned respectively by Google, Yahoo!
and Microsoft.
III. EXPERIMENTAL METHODOLOGY
We aim to study the impact of online tracking and adver-
tising in Ibero-America by measuring the third-party traffic
triggered when browsing websites in this region. In the next
subsections, we shall describe how the data related to this
traffic was generated, collected and processed. It is important
to remark that our measurement study relies on the ads.txt
standard, increasingly being adopted by websites for some
years now. ads.txt is a project promoted by the Inter-
net Advertising Bureau (IAB) to increase transparency in
the programmatic advertising ecosystem and prevent fraud.
It encourages publishers to publicly inform the companies
they have authorized to sell their advertising inventory (ad
spaces). Such publication is done through a text file (so much
like the robots.txt standard) called ads.txt in the root
context of the website.
A. SELECTION AND CATEGORIZATION OF WEBSITES
1) SELECTION OF WEBSITES
We started by selecting the countries of Ibero-America whose
websites will be analyzed. We chose the countries in this
region that allowed us a VPN connection so that web traf-
fic could be generated from such locations. This included
Spain and Portugal from the EU and the following LATAM
countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. For some
tests involving web traffic directed to LATAM, we also
included other countries.
Next, we gathered themost popular websites within each of
the aforementioned countries. For this, we manually selected
only the local websites from the top 500 ranking published
for each country by the Alexa Top Sites service offered by
Amazon [23]. For other experiments, we also collected the
top 500 global websites also using this service as source. In a
nutshell, our experimental scenario consisted of 12 countries,
2 076 Ibero-American websites and 500 top-world websites.
2) CATEGORIZATION OF WEBSITES
With the aim of understanding the influence of the content
published in websites on the phenomena studied in this work,
we also labeled each website tested according its content.
We manually categorized each of the websites, with the sup-
port of the Site Safety Center tool of Trend Micro [24] and
the categorization software developed by [25].
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B. DATA COLLECTION
The data we studied mainly included all the third-party
requests spawned by visiting a website. Assessing the magni-
tude of such traffic, the destination third-parties participating,
and even the tracking information they may set in the user
side (cookies), may help to unveil the inherent privacy risks
of users browsing these sites.
Our experiments involved simulating websites visits to
trigger third-party traffic. For the thousands of websites
in our scenario, we performed this (including data col-
lection) automatically through OpenWPM, a versatile tool
used for web measurement [11]. OpenWPM offers a pro-
grammable interface to orchestrate the main functions of a
web browser, thus allowing automated web crawling and
collection of tracking-related information (redirects, cookies
and third-party calls) that is stored in a SQLite database. To
study the adoption of the ads.txt advertising standard,
we also employed this tool.
C. EXPERIMENTS
Weperformed several tests simulatingweb traffic from differ-
ent countries in Ibero-America, given our interest in studying
potential privacy risks in this region. As commented previ-
ously, we utilized a VPN service to connect to each of said
countries and send web traffic to local websites.
First, we generated local traffic, i.e., visits from each coun-
try to websites in the same country. Furthermore, we simu-
lated visits from (a country in) EU to websites in LATAM
countries. This way we tried to detect different effects when
the same publishers are visited from diverse locations. Since
the particular website being visited is likely to be determinant
(especially if widely popular),we also simulated web traffic
from Ibero-American countries to top-world sites.
Through OpenWPM, we collected information on (1) the
third-party requests triggered by simulated user browsing,
and on (2) added third-party cookies set on the user side. From
said data, we also measured advertising related requests,
which, associated with a personalized service, may imply
higher privacy risks. To measure the dynamics of advertising
interactions, we classified third-party requests as ad related
or not, by resorting to available libraries that, based on ad
blocking lists [26], facilitate the detection of such type of
traffic.
We aimed at unveiling privacy risks by measuring the
intensity of third-party traffic (including ad related interac-
tions) and counting the number of entities behind such traffic,
and the cookies set in the browser. Third-party traffic, mea-
sured as the mean number of third party requests triggered
from websites, is a first approach to unveil potential privacy
issues. The greater the indirect and non-consensual traffic
from users, the more user information is released through
such flows. In the same line, we obtained the number of
third-parties receiving said traffic as a proxy to the number
of potential third-party trackers. We also counted the mean
number of cookies set by third-parties, and particularly those
cookies more likely to be related to user pseudo-identifiers.
Since online tracking tightly depends on this information,
measuring this parameter contributed to our objective of
detecting privacy risks.
To ascertain the impact of the type of content served by
publishers on the intensity of third-party tracking, we tab-
ulated the information collected according to the categories
of websites. Since the consumers of certain (categories of)
content might be more relevant in economic terms, the sites
associated with such content might be more exposed to
third-party tracking and privacy risks.
Finally, we identified the Ibero-American publishers where
the ads.txt file was present. From the data obtained,
we studied the adoption of this standard in Ibero-America




In Fig. 3, we illustrate the impact of third-party traffic
triggered by browsing Ibero-American web sites locally,
i.e., from each country. Such map representation enables us
to illustrate the geography, size, and potential population
of involved countries. This perspective reveals the marked
heterogeneity not only among Latin American countries, but
particularly among them and EU countries (here represented
by Spain and Portugal).
FIGURE 3. Heat map illustrating the mean number of third-party requests
triggered from local traffic in Ibero-American countries. The countries
included are those to which we could connect through a VPN service to
simulate web traffic.
Much traffic towards third-parties is observed in this con-
text. Besides the great number of third-party requests trig-
gered in general by a single visit to publishers, we evidence
that such traffic is not homogeneous along countries. Since
the volume of interaction with third-parties could be a proxy
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for potential privacy risks, the resulting impact on privacy
would also vary from country to country.
Having a greater volume of third-party traffic, it stands out
that some large and populated countries, such as Brazil and
Peru, receive a lower impact than that in Portugal and Spain,
although the latter are much smaller and less populated.
On the other hand, Argentina, Mexico, and Chile do show an
important number of third-party requests spawned by local
traffic.
Beyond the disparity in Latin American countries, Euro-
pean publishers and users seem to be more attractive targets
for third-party tracking. This might imply a higher risk for
such users since more entities and more personal informa-
tion would be involved. However, many of these third-party
requests could have the same destination, so it is convenient to
identify the recipient entities (third-party trackers) by filtering
the domain names from their destination URLs. As noted
above, insofar these entities receive so much indirect user
traffic, they might become attackers, not only against user
privacy but also against user security.
As commented in Section I, the number of third-party
domains behind online tracking may better reflect a poten-
tial privacy attack scenario since it could serve as a proxy
of the number of third-party entities collecting informa-
tion (third-party trackers). As depicted in Fig. 4, hundreds
of entities were found receiving third-party requests, indi-
rectly, from users, when locally visiting Ibero-American sites.
European countries had a very similar number of potential
third-party trackers while in Latin America the situation is
less uniform. In Brazil andMexico, by far the most populated
countries, we found the greatest number of third-party enti-
ties. However, we think the difference with other countries is
certainly minor, considering the variation in population.
FIGURE 4. Number of third-party domains contacted as a result of local
traffic within Ibero-American countries.
One might think that websites in a country of hundreds of
millions of citizens, such as Brazil, would spawn much more
third-party traffic than those in a country with a couple of
tens of millions (e.g., Chile, Spain, and particularly Portugal),
but the difference is not as marked as the population. There
might be some reasons. First, it could reflect a preference
of potential trackers to certain type of population. However,
third-party requests are also generated by technology ser-
vices, e.g., content distribution, commonly used by publish-
ers. Thus, more entities behind third-party traffic could also
indicate more tech supporting websites. In any case, there
would be more privacy risk for a user if he is targeted in a
small population than in a big one.
By weighting the number of third-party domains by the
population of countries (in millions of inhabitants) as shown
in Fig. 5, we tried to capture the latter effect. We can see in
this figure that, despite being very sparsely populated, Costa
Rica, Uruguay, and Portugal spawn a lot of third-party traffic.
Despite its size, these are relative rich countries, in particular
when compared with the average in Latin America, which
we think could explain this behavior to some extent. Para-
doxically, richer countries are more prone to implementing
strong privacy legislation, which in this context does not seem
to discourage third-party traffic. Note that this behavior is
measured when crawling local sites of each country from the
same country.
FIGURE 5. Number of third-party domains contacted as a result of local
traffic, weighted by population, within Ibero-American countries.
In our attempt to identify third-party tracking, and specif-
ically personal data leaking, another interesting indicator
might be the mean number of third-party cookies set in the
user’s browser. Recall from Section II that third-party cookies
may be used to transport user identifiers that online trackers
employ to recognize a user when she visits a publisher. This
way, a tracker is able to ‘‘follow’’ users and associate informa-
tion to their profiles. We cataloged these cookies as tracking
cookies or identifying cookies (ID cookies) if their lengths
were greater than 6.
When processing the data obtained from local traffic
within Ibero-American countries, we found that a user brows-
ing local sites from Portugal would receive 14 ID cookies
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FIGURE 6. Mean number of identifying third-party cookies found as
result of local traffic within Ibero-American countries.
on average, as depicted in Fig. 6. Spain, Argentina, and
Colombia follow with 8 ID cookies on average. This figure
shows that this number varies along the different countries but
suggests a great interest of Portuguese local sites in tracking
local users.
Since we categorized each of the publishers visited along
our experiments, we could represent in Fig. 7 the poten-
tial influence of the content delivered by publishers on
the tracking performed over users. As shown in other
works [11], [27], news/media, entertainment, and
shopping/travel are the categories concentrating more
third-party tracking, in this case when local traffic is studied
in Ibero-American countries. Some particularities should be
noted about some countries: users from Costa Rica would be
receiving a lot of third-party tracking triggered by education
and government sites; and, fromBrazil, would occur the same
with weather.
As a consequence, some of these categories may entail
more privacy risks than others. For instance, education
could involve audiences including children or teenagers who
are clearly more vulnerable to abuse, more if the sites belong-
ing to these category require any kind of login. Also, proba-
bly, government sites should not be tracking their citizens,
even worse to ‘‘profit’’ from their interactions if coupled, e.g.
with advertising platforms.
When comparing traffic to LATAM originated locally vs.
from the EU, traffic from the EU spawns, in general, more
third-party requests per website as shown in Fig. 8. Namely,
when traffic originates in EU, more third-party interactions
are observed in most of LATAM countries. Chile is the
exception.
Although the intensity of third-party traffic is higher for
web browsing from the EU than internally in LATAM,
the total number of domains or entities behind third-party
traffic is very similar, no matter where the web traffic orig-
inates, as depicted in Fig. 9. The same entities would be
FIGURE 7. Mean number of ID third-party cookies set from local traffic
within Ibero-American countries, organized by category of publisher.
FIGURE 8. Mean number of third-party requests triggered by web traffic
from the EU to LATAM.
involved in third-party traffic but changing the tracking strat-
egy depending on the location of the user. However, when
comparing web traffic from the EU vs web traffic from
LATAM (to the same LATAM websites), the total number of
third-party entities does not vary significantly, although web
traffic from the EU would be covered by the GDPR. It seems,
then, that the extraterritorial effect of such a regulation is not
effective in this context.
It is still compelling that very small countries such as
Uruguay and Costa Rica might be tracked by a lot of entities
despite their small population. When weighting such number
of third-party domains by the population of countries, as illus-
trated in Fig. 10, this detail is evidenced. On the other hand,
note how huge and highly populated countries such as Brazil
andMexico show an opposite phenomenon: a relatively small
number of third-party entities. This again characterizes a
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FIGURE 9. Total number of third-party domains found behind web traffic
from the EU to LATAM.
FIGURE 10. Total number of third-party domains found behind web
traffic from the EU to LATAM.
marked heterogeneity in the Latin American context, where
tiny populations might become the target of several external
entities. Naturally, individuals in such groups would be more
exposed to privacy risks than those in larger groups.
For some countries, the number of identifying cookies
is slightly greater when web requests are generated locally
(Argentina, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Peru) than when coming
from the EU, although in Chile such number is doubled (see
Fig. 11). The opposite occurs in the rest of the countries
(Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Uruguay). The inherent potential
tracking, then, varies from country to country and apparently
regardless its origin is EU or LATAM. Probably, in this
regard, a more individualized study should be developed to
unveil the reasons of this behavior.
When testing web traffic from Ibero-American countries to
the top-world sites, we found out in Fig. 12 that the number
of derived third-party requests seems to be, in general, stable
FIGURE 11. Mean number of third-party ID cookies found behind web
traffic from the EU to LATAM.
FIGURE 12. Mean number of third-party requests triggered by web traffic
to top-world sites.
along all the countries analyzed. Interestingly, the same effect
is shown when illustrating in Fig. 13 the total number of
third-party domains behind such interactions. Note, however,
that this number of entities is almost ten times greater than
that when the web traffic was directed to local sites.
The behavior of third-party tracking may be significantly
more intense when visiting globally popular sites, no matter
the source of such visits. Thus, in this scenario, the relative
impact on small countries such us Costa Rica, Uruguay and
Portugal might be greater given its small population.
The mean number of identifying cookies set when vis-
iting top-world sites from Ibero-America is also homoge-
neous along the countries tested. This number is certainly
greater thanwhenweb traffic is directed to LATAMcountries,
despite the number of entities behind is ten times higher.
That the number of potential tracking cookies does not grow
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FIGURE 13. Total number of third-party domains found behind web
traffic to top-world sites.
FIGURE 14. Mean number of ID third-party cookies set by web traffic to
top-world sites, from Ibero-American countries, organized by category of
publisher.
as significantly as the number of third-party domains may
suggest that widely popular websites could be also resorting
to other more sophisticated tracking mechanisms.
The mean number of identifying cookies set when vis-
iting top-world sites from Ibero-America is also homoge-
neous along the countries tested. This number is certainly
greater thanwhenweb traffic is directed to LATAMcountries,
despite the number of entities behind is ten times higher.
That the number of potential tracking cookies does not grow
as significantly as the number of third-party domains may
suggest that widely popular websites could be also resorting
to other more sophisticated tracking mechanisms.
Finally, as shown in Fig. 14, news/media and
shopping/travel were again the categories spawning
more third-party tracking when browsing top-world sites.
Since a wider spectrum of sites was covered in this experi-
ment, other categories were also relevant in terms of poten-
tial tracking such as weather, lottery and health.
Regarding privacy risks, note how, in this context, sites
potentially serving, collecting and even sharing very sensitive
information (health or pornography) could be the source of
intense third-party tracking.
In any case, gateways of information such as digital news-
papers or sites involving any kind of commerce are those
spawning a great deal of tracking, either because of their big
audiences or because user willingness to buy in these sites is
high, no matter where users are located.
B. ONLINE ADVERTISING
To study the impact of online advertising in the context of
Ibero-America, we resort to measuring ad related third-party
tracking, and to gathering the information hosted by publish-
ers in compliance with the ads.txt standard.
1) ANALYSIS THROUGH THE ads.txt STANDARD
Recall that the ads.txt standard promotes that websites
publicly inform the companies or domains they have autho-
rized to sell their advertising inventory through a text file
called ads.txt in the root context of the website. The pub-
lication of this file by a website shows a strong commitment
of the publisher with the advertising industry and could give
In Fig. 15, the adoption of the standard ads.txt is
depicted. Longer curves such as those of Portugal and Spain
indicate that more websites host this file including the ad
exchanges authorized to sell ad spaces from said websites.
The figure shows that the adoption of ads.txt in Latin
American countries is still reduced compared to the countries
analyzed in the EU.Only Brazil andArgentina present similar
levels of adoption. In any case, the number of records per
website goes from 1 to 150 for most countries. The specific
domains involved are studied below.
To show how third-party entities are distributed along
websites in Ibero-America, based on the records found in
the ads.txt files, we first plotted Fig. 16. This ECDF
shows that 1% of the third-party domains found appear on
more than 20% of the websites crawled (more than 70%
of the sites hosting an ads.txt). Thus, the concentra-
tion of advertising in a few entities is evident in this con-
text; to give an example, google.com were engaged with
all the sites that had adopted this standard, and 4 oth-
ers (rubicon, appnexus, openx and pubmatic)
were engaged with more than 70% of the sites that had an
ads.txt file.
When analyzing websites by category in Table 1, we found
that ads.txt is widely adopted by news/media sites,
followed by entertainment and shopping/travel,
as it happened with third-party tracking. Besides, in Table 2,
we depict the mean number of third-party domains identi-
fied within ads.txt files. Although, a few education
related publishers were found that have adopted this standard,
the records in the ads.txt file in these sites included even
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FIGURE 15. Number of records in ads.txt files found in websites of Ibero-American countries.
FIGURE 16. ECDF % of web sites covered by third-party domains in
Ibero-American countries.
more third-party domains than news/media. Note that no
government hosted an ads.txt file in this scenario.
2) ANALYSIS THROUGH THE AD RELATED TRAFFIC
When analyzing ad related traffic generated in Latin Amer-
ican sites, as a result of browsing from LATAM and EU,
we can see that, in general, web traffic from the EU triggers
a little more ad related tracking than traffic from LATAM,
except in Chile and Peru. This was illustrated in Fig. 17 where
themean number of ad related requests spawned by country is
presented. Websites from Argentina trigger, by far, the high-
est intensity of ad related traffic, followed by Venezuela. The
context is certainly heterogenous but, as stated in previous
paragraphs, the source of web traffic might be influencing
the ad related tracking derived when browsing LATAM local
sites.
TABLE 1. Number of websites having adopted the ads.txt standard in
Ibero-American countries by category.
TABLE 2. Mean number of third-party domains found in ads.txt files by
category of website in Ibero-American countries.
We can see that traffic from the EU to LATAM would
trigger more ad related tracking than traffic to LATAM.
Thus, the location of users in this scenario would affect
the level of user tracking. Furthermore, if user browsing
originates in LATAM and directs to top-world sites, this
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FIGURE 17. Mean number of ad related requests spawned from web
traffic to LATAM when originated locally (LATAM) and from the EU.
FIGURE 18. Mean number of ad related requests triggered by local traffic.
type of tracking increases notably; its proportion with respect
to all third-party traffic is, however, reduced. Consequently,
we can confirm, although not entirely unexpectedly, that users
browsing very popular websites would be more exposed to ad
related tracking.
Based on the content served by publishers, we found
that categoriesnews/media andentertainment exhib-
ited the highest ad related traffic both when web traffic
comes from LATAM and from the EU. For some countries,
employment and weather caused important ad related
traffic. This is depicted in Figs. 18 and 19.
Moreover, the impact of this third-party traffic in
government sites is minor, but it is present in all countries,
although we believe commercial advertising for profit should
not be engaged with public sites already funded by the taxes
of citizens. We found out 103 and 135 government sites
triggering ad related tracking from visiting LATAM sites
FIGURE 19. Mean number of ad related requests triggered by web traffic
from the EU to LATAM.
FIGURE 20. Mean number of ad related requests triggered by web traffic
from top-world sites.
locally and from the EU, respectively. More than 90% of
these government sites were covered by third-party domains
coupled with Google.
When measuring ad related requests triggered by
web traffic to top-world publishers, news/media sites
showed an important ad tracking activity, followed by
entertainment, as with the contexts analyzed previ-
ously. This is shown in 20. However, in these very popular
sites, a significant tracking activity is also observed for
several other categories such asemployment,education
and health. The intrinsic privacy risks involved in this
interactions, thus, might be present in a wider spectrum of
publishers, including some categorized as education and
healthwebsites, which could be collecting, processing and
sharing very sensitive data.
We calculated the prevalence of these third-party entities
along local websites in Ibero-America, and presented the data
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TABLE 3. Prevalence of third-party domains behind ad related traffic
along websites visited in Ibero-American countries locally.
TABLE 4. Prevalence of third-party domains behind ad related traffic
along websites visited in Ibero-American countries from the EU.
in Tables 3 and 4. We found that domains owned by Google
were massively behind advertising traffic. In particular
among the 10most prevalent third-party domains, at least half
of them belonged to this company.doubleclick.net, for
example, appeared at more than 40% of the websites crawled
from LATAM, a similar coverage of google.es when web
traffic originated in EU. Besides, the third-party domains
involved and their prevalence vary if traffic to LATAM orig-
inates in EU; the prevalence of some third-party domains
along websites is, in fact, slightly higher. Again, this would
suggest that users browsing from the EU would be more
exposed to the inherent user profiling and tracking of online
advertising than LATAM users.
V. CONCLUSION
User location affects the intensity of third-party traffic,
including advertising related flows of information, triggered
from browsing Ibero-American websites. This is evident first
when assessing local web traffic, i.e., when browsing these
sites from their country of origin. LATAM and EU countries
in this region showed a significant heterogeneity among them
in this respect. But the influence of location is also shown
whenmeasuring the interactions spawned byweb traffic from
the EU to LATAM.We found out that traffic originating in EU
spawns more third-party interactions. Despite stricter privacy
regulations in the EU, users from such locations would be
more exposed than users from LATAM to the targeting and
profiling performed by external trackers.
Interestingly, the total number of potential trackers
(third-party domains) found behind third-party requests,
including ad related requests, is similar either web traffic is
local or from the EU. It seems the same entities are involved in
third-party traffic but change their tracking strategy depend-
ing on the location of the user.
Users from particular locations might be more ‘‘relevant’’
for online tracking and advertising. Despite the very small
population of some countries, the level of third-party traffic
derived from them is comparable to that of other huge coun-
tries. Portugal is an example.
When top-world sites are the destination of web traffic gen-
erated from Ibero-America, the user location parameter is less
relevant to the intensity of potential third-party tracking, since
the mean number of requests triggered is similar among the
source Ibero-American countries. Privacy risks arise higher
in this context since more third-party requests are spawned
and significantly more third-party domains are found behind.
Websites or publishers whose content falls into the cate-
gories news/media, entertainment or shopping/
travel showed the greatest levels of potential third-party
tracking and third-party entities. Thus, the interactions with
said websites might entail more privacy risks in different con-
texts. Note that when web traffic goes to top-world websites,
this risk is extended to other categories related to the collec-
tion of sensitive data, such as health or education.
The level of adoption of the ads.txt standard in LATAM
is still low compared to that of the EU. The information it
reveals is valuable to study the third-parties (ad exchanges)
officially coupled with publishers. It evidences the concen-
tration of advertising in a single company, Google; and
in publishers associated with the categories news/media,
entertainment or shopping/travel.
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